발표자: 전도신 교수, Toulouse School of Economics
날짜: 2025.12.18 (목)
시간: 05:00 PM - 06:30 PM
장소: 정경관 326호
주제: AI Safety and Competition
논문 내용은 하기 초록 확인 부탁드립니다:
We would like to inform you about the upcoming Economics seminar:
Speaker: Prof. Doh-Shin Jeon, Toulouse School of Economics
Date: Thu., Dec. 18, 2025
Time: 05:00 PM - 06:30 PM
Venue: Room 326, Sangnam Political Science and Economics Building
Topic: AI Safety and Competition
In regards to the details of the thesis, please find the abstract below:
Title:
Optimal Monetary Policy for Proof-of-Stake Ethereum with Varying Capacity Requirement
Abstract:
This paper investigates how competition affects the deployment timing of general-purpose AI technologies in the presence of safety risks. We begin by analyzing the monopoly case as a benchmark to delineate the effects of competition on deployment timing. To capture the homogenization of AI systems, we assume a positive correlation between the risk profiles of the competing technologies developed across firms. Our analysis reveals that competition can lead to two contrasting distortions, depending on the nature of competition, risk correlation, and the informativeness of beta testing: a race to the bottom or insufficient entry. The race to the bottom occurs when the first-mover advantage induces firms to deploy prematurely, even though it would be socially optimal to delay entry until the beta testing results are available. We find that as AI systems become more homogenized, the race to the bottom is more likely. Conversely, the incentive to free-ride on a rival’s experimentation may result in too little entry. We further discuss potential regulatory policies aimed at mitigating these distortions and improving the timing of AI technology deployment.